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Abstract
A significant implication arising out of an increasingly influential view that fiduciary
duties are terms expressed or implied into voluntary undertakings is that all express or
implied  fiduciary  duties  can  be  excluded.  This  article  critiques  this  implication  by
advancing the argument that this implication is doctrinally unjustified and normatively
questionable  through  an  analysis  of  the  circumstances  in  which  directors’ fiduciary
duties have been contracted out under English law.
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There is extensive literature that views the law on fiduciary duties from a contractual
perspective; this view is largely grounded on economic justification and is centred on
American jurisprudence.1 But Justice James Edelman has attempted to characterise and
rationalise fiduciary duties as contracts from an English doctrinal standpoint; he deploys
case-law to show that fiduciary duties are terms expressed or implied into voluntary
undertakings.2 A significant  implication  arises  from this  understanding  of  fiduciary
duties: Edelman J claims that ‘in English law all express or implied fiduciary duties can
be excluded’.3 It has also been said that ‘(1) provisions limiting or excluding liability for
... fiduciary obligation are permissible, except, as in contract, for “core obligations”; and
(2)  ...  fiduciary  exclusion  clauses  are,  or  should  be,  subject  to  the  same  sort  of
unconscionability standard that applies in contract law’.4 Edelman J substantiates his
claim by citing three cases whose subject matter can be broadly categorised under the
heading of  agency, contract,  torts  and trust.5 But  this  article  seeks  to show that  the
position is more nuanced and complex than that stated by Edelman J through a critical
analysis of directors’ fiduciary duties under English law.
This  article  examines  the  implication  that  all  fiduciary  duties  can  and  should  be
excluded absent fraud and unconscionability from an English company law perspective.
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Specifically,  it  undertakes  a  close  doctrinal  analysis  of  the  circumstances  in  which
directors’  fiduciary  duties  have  been  contracted  out  in  statutory  and  common  law
through the mechanisms of authorisation,  ratification and exemption.  It  is contended
that those who characterise fiduciary duties from an essentially contractual perspective
should undertake a detailed analysis of company law doctrine in order to substantiate
the claim that  all  fiduciary duties, of which directors’ duties are a prime example and
therefore warrant close analysis, can and should be excluded.
The concern here is that in attempting to conceptualise and rationalise the entire law on
fiduciary  duties  from  a  contractual  perspective,  the  complexities  and  nuances  of
doctrine in other branches of law may have either been overlooked or downplayed, thus
giving rise to a partial  account.  This is because in the context of company law, the
ability  to  limit  liability  for,  or  contract  out  of,  directors’  fiduciary  duties,  through
authorisation (giving advance consent to an act or transaction that would otherwise be a
breach of duty) or ratification (consenting to the breach after it has taken place thereby
releasing  the  director  from liability)6 is  subject  to  substantial  constraints,  which are
independent of the parties’ voluntary undertaking. For example, it must be made in the
best  interests  of  the  company,7 it  must  not  be  brought  about  by unfair  or  improper
means,8 must not be illegal or oppressive towards the minority shareholders,9 and the
majority shareholders must not appropriate themselves money, property or advantage
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which belong to the company,10 or in which the minority shareholders are entitled to
participate.11 Ratification  is  impermissible,  for  example, if  the  breach  involves
misappropriation of the company’s property whereas it is arguably allowed if it involves
merely making an incidental profit.12 
Needless to say, these constraints are of a different nature from, and extend way beyond,
the  ‘vitiating  factors’ imposed  in  a  typical  private  contractual  arrangement  such  as
fraud,  duress,  undue  influence  or  unconscionability.  These  constraints  are  imposed
regardless of the undertaking of the parties. Indeed, just as there are breaches that are
non-ratifiable,13 there are those that arguably can never be authorised. These constraints
could be justified on the basis of fairness to minority shareholders. Finally, other than
authorisation  and  ratification,  the  other  mechanism for  contracting  out  of  fiduciary
duties is the direct exemption of directors from breach of duties through provisions in
the company’s articles; it will be argued that section 232(4) of the Companies Act 2006
(the “Act”) only provides extremely limited circumstances under which this is possible.
And in relation to provisions that indirectly exempt directors from liability, it will be
argued that the law should require the directors voting as shareholders to act bona fide
for the benefit of the company as a whole; this duty should be imposed regardless of the
undertaking of the parties.
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Part I of this article summarises the doctrinal claim made by Edelman J as well as the
claims grounded on economic justifications. The circumstances under which directors’
(fiduciary) duties have been contracted out or excluded in relation to authorisation and
ratification as well as exemption are critically analysed in Parts II and III, respectively.
The arguments in Parts II and III have both positive and normative aspects. Positively,
this  article  demonstrates  that  the  limitations  imposed  by  law  with  respect  to
authorisation,  ratification and exemption require Edelman J’s claim that all  fiduciary
duties can be excluded to be qualified. Normatively, this article argues that protection of
minority shareholders provide a sound justification for these limitations, thus casting
doubt  on  the  assumption  underlying  the  view  that  all  fiduciary  duties  are  terms
expressed or implied into voluntary undertakings that party autonomy should be the
overriding value.14 The analysis here therefore lends support to the argument that there
is  a  vital  moral  dimension  to  fiduciary  duties  which  is  not  necessarily  captured  in
Edelman  J’s  view  that  rationalises  the  entire  law  of  fiduciary  duties  according  to
voluntary undertakings.15 Thus, parties not only could not exclude all fiduciary duties,
but they should be barred from doing so under certain circumstances even if there is no
dishonesty, unconscionability  or  coercion.  Further, it  is  submitted  that  justifying  the
limitations  imposed  by  law  on  ratifying  and  exempting  liability  from  breaches  of
directors’ fiduciary duties on the basis of protection of minority shareholders provides a
clearer and more coherent explanation than those stated in the prevailing commentaries,
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that is,  certain breaches are not ratifiable  (or not authorisable)  because they involve
misappropriation  of  company’s  property,16 and  liability  can  be  exempted  under  the
articles provided the directors put themselves in a position of potential as opposed to
actual conflict of interest.17 
Excluding fiduciary duties
Edelman J cites  Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew18 for the proposition that
fiduciary duties  are terms express or implied into voluntary undertakings.19 He cites
Kelly v Cooper20 (a case involving the duty of an estate agent to disclose to his principal
confidential information concerning his rival principal in two separate transactions) and
Citibank NA v QVT Financial LP21 (which concerns the ability of trustees to exclude
duties to act in the beneficiary’s best interests) as authorities for the proposition that
fiduciary  duties  can  be  excluded  expressly  or  by  implication.22 He  then  considers
whether there are any fiduciary duties that cannot be excluded. He relies on the dictum
of Lord Scott in Hilton v Baker Booth and Eastwood (a firm)23 that the solicitors could
expressly exclude their duty to avoid conflict of interest although they did not do so on
the facts.24 He then considers the objection that certain irreducible core of trust duties
cannot be excluded and argues that the objection is contrary to authority.25 He states that
the only limitation on the ability to contract out of fiduciary duties is the duty to act
honestly because the latter is imposed by law and exists independently of contract.26
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Edelman J then arrives at this conclusion: ‘In summary then, in English law all express
or implied fiduciary duties can be excluded’.27 This conclusion is highly problematic as
will be shown in the examination of directors’ fiduciary duties under common law and
statute;  the  duty to  act  honestly  is  not  the  only limitation.  Fairness  to  minorities  is
another. Indeed, the courts have set forth limitations on the ability of shareholders to
exclude directors’ fiduciary duties under the statute, whether we are referring to ex ante
exclusion  in  the  form  of  authorisation  or  exemption  under  section  180(4)(a)28 and
section 232(4)29 of the Act, respectively, or ex post exclusion in the form of ratification
under section 239.30
Other than the doctrinal justifications, economic reasons have been advanced in support
of the view that all fiduciary obligations can be excluded.31 Law and economic scholars
view fiduciary duties as  a  standard form contract  comprising default  rules of which
participants are free to contract out. To them, fiduciary obligations perform a gap filling
function by allowing terms to be implied into the agreements so that the parties do not
and should not need to agree to everything in advance. Accordingly, it has been said that
parties can opt out of the ‘fiduciary package’32 such as through the incorporation of an
exemption clause or by obtaining the principal/beneficiary’s informed consent. Indeed,
if fiduciary duties are viewed as default rules, or as expressed in the contract or implied
in the underlying arrangement, rather than imposed by the law despite or independent of
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the  parties’ consent,  then  the  beneficiaries  should  be able  to  authorise  or  ratify  the
breach; or exempt directors from liability.  
However, critics argue that viewing fiduciary duties as contracts is erroneous because
fiduciary  obligations  differ  from  contracts  in  terms  of  doctrine,  ethical  basis  and
purpose.33 They also argue that to characterise fiduciary duties as default rules ‘strip
fiduciary rules of their moral content’.34 Crucially, they argue that proponents of the
view of fiduciary duties as default  rules fail  to develop a coherent  theory about the
extent  to  which  fiduciary  duties  can  be  modified.35 Indeed,  although  there  are
discussions of the means by which fiduciary duties can be contracted out ex ante and ex
post,36 proponents of the view of fiduciary duties as contracts  have paid insufficient
attention  to  the  mandatory  limitations  on  these  opting  out  mechanisms.37 These
limitations undermine the claim that as long as informed consent is obtained from those
to whom duties are owed, all fiduciary duties can be excluded, or liability arising from
the  breach of  such  duties  can  be  released, except  those  involving  dishonesty  or
unconscionability. 
Equally important, these mandatory limitations cast doubt on the claim that such duties
should be framed exclusively or primarily in terms of contract or voluntary agreement,
in which party autonomy is the overriding value to the exclusion or subordination of
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other values. For example, it has been said that the view that fiduciary obligations are
consensual matters because it suggests that ‘they must take second place to the parties’
own wishes, as expressed in their contract, or in the absence of an explicit contract, in
the  terms  of  their  underlying  arrangements.’38 This  view ‘...  treats  the  parties’ own
preference as paramount...’39 
It will be argued below that the cases show solicitude for minority shareholders (despite
the majoritarian principle remaining the overarching principle). Courts have sought to
ensure that minority shareholders are treated fairly, even though it was not demonstrated
that absent transaction costs, shareholders would have bargained for those terms that are
protective of minority shareholders. These limitations will be demonstrated in Part II
below. An important  feature  of  these  limitations  is  that  the  law is  concerned  about
fairness to minority shareholders, a view which is not taken into account by Edelman J
who claims that all fiduciary duties are excludable absent fraud or unconscionability.40
This  is  a  significant  distinguishing  feature  in  company  law,  as  compared  to  other
branches of law, of which advocates of the view that all fiduciary duties are excludable
should take into account. Indeed, it has been argued that corporate law rules ‘were and
still are directed primarily toward the protection of the property interests of minority
shareholders’.41 Further,  it  has  been  demonstrated  empirically  that  ‘corporate
governance is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside investors
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[the non-controlling or minority shareholders] protect themselves against expropriation
by the insiders’,42 namely, the controlling shareholders and managers.43
Authorisation and ratification44
Limitations
Section 180(4)(a)  of  the  Act  permits  members  to  authorise  (in  terms  of  providing
advance consent to) directors’ breach of duties.45 Section 239 permits members to ratify
(in  terms  of  providing  consent  to)  breaches  that  have  already  been  committed  by
directors, the effect of which is to release them from liability.46 Both provisions do not
state the limitations on the use of these mechanisms except sections 239(3) and 239(4)
which require disinterested voting. We have to turn to the common law to understand
these limitations.
It  is  important  to  note  that  these  limitations  are  not  merely  additions  to  the  list  of
existing constraints to the exercise of the right to contract out of fiduciary duties, such
as coercion or dishonesty. In other words, they are not merely further conditions to the
right to exclude fiduciary duties. Crucially, as will be shown in this section, the law’s
recognition of the existence of certain wrongs that can neither be ratified nor authorised,
undermines a key assumption underlying Edelman J’s view that all fiduciary duties are
voluntary  undertakings,  that  is,  party  autonomy  is  and  ought  to  be  the  paramount
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consideration.  This  is  because,  it  is  submitted,  the  protection  of  minorities  is  an
important justification for the existence of non-ratifiable wrongs. It is submitted that
Edelman J’s view should account properly for the importance that the law accords to
ensuring that minority shareholders are treated fairly. 
In North-West Transportation Co v Beatty,47 the Privy Council held that authorisation or
ratification is permissible provided that ‘it is not brought about by unfair or improper
means and is not illegal or fraudulent  or oppressive towards those shareholders who
oppose  it’.48 There,  the  claimant  shareholder  sued  on  behalf  of  himself  and  other
shareholders. The defendants were the company and five shareholders.  The claim was
to set aside a sale made to the company by one of the directors, James Hughes Beatty, of
a steamer of which he was the sole owner. On 7 February, Beatty and his supporters
successfully adopted a by-law in a general meeting for the purpose of authorising the
contract between Beatty and the company.49 The by-law was passed and the contract
was entered  into  on 10 February.  The court  did  not  find that  the  authorisation  was
procured by unfair or improper means, nor was there oppressive conduct towards the
minorities. The court held that the fact that the interested director Beatty voted in his
capacity as shareholder to adopt the by-law did not amount to oppression of minorities.
This is because the court found that the price of the steamer was based on market price
and the transaction was fair. Thus, the sale was not set aside.
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The  principle  that  interested  directors  are  allowed  to  vote  in  a  general  meeting
concerning  transactions  between  themselves  and  the  company  was  affirmed  in  a
subsequent Privy Council  decision in  Burland v Earle.50 But this principle,  although
applicable to authorisation, no longer applies to ratification because section 239 of the
Act requires the votes of the interested director to be disregarded in a general meeting;
in  other  words,  the  statutory  limitation  on  voting  only  applies  to  ratification  under
section 239, not authorisation under section 180(4)(a).51
Nonetheless,  Burland  v  Earle is  relevant  for  the  purpose  of  this  article  because  it
reiterates the principle that neither authorisation nor ratification is permitted if ‘the acts
complained of are of a fraudulent character52 or beyond the powers of the company. A
familiar  example  is  where  the  majority  are  endeavoring  directly  or  indirectly  to
appropriate themselves money, property or advantages which belong to the company, or
in which the other shareholders are entitled to participate, as was in the case of Menier
v Hooper’s Telegraph Works.’ 53, 54 In Menier, the defendant was a major shareholder of
the  company  and  had  contracted  with  it  to  engage  in  a  substantial  business.  The
claimant, a minority shareholder, alleged that the defendant had used its votes to procure
the diversion of the contract to another company and to have the company wound up.
Mellish LJ held that ‘the majority of shareholders cannot sell the assets of the company
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and keep the consideration,  but  must  allow the minority  to  have their  share of  any
consideration which may come to them.’55 
Accordingly, we can see from the analysis of the above cases that the law is protective
of the interests of minority shareholders. This principle is further evidenced in the case
of  Cook v Deeks, which will be analysed below. Further, it will be argued below that
this principle provides a sound justification for the distinction between ratifiable and
non-ratifiable breaches, i.e. between breaches that can be consented to and those that
cannot.
It should be noted, however, that fraud has a more expansive meaning than that stated in
the cases above, and of course it is much broader than that understood in contract law.
In Daniels v Daniels,56 Templeman J held that the term ‘fraud’ should extend to cases of
self-serving negligence.   He said that  the  fraud on the minority  principle  would be
satisfied ‘where directors use their powers intentionally or unintentionally, fraudulently
or  negligently  in  a  manner  which  benefited  themselves  at  the  expense  of  the
company’,57 the  consequence  of  which is  that the  fraudulent  wrongdoing cannot  be
ratified.58
13
In  the  well-known  Privy  Council  case  of  Cook  v  Deeks,59 the  court  held  that  the
company cannot ratify the wrongdoing of the directors if ‘the contract in question was
entered into under such circumstances that the director could not retain the benefit of it
for themselves, then it belonged in equity to the company and ought to have been dealt
with as an asset of the company… directors holding a majority of votes would not be
permitted to make a present to themselves. This would be to allow a majority to oppress
the minority.’60 Although the limitation imposed by the House relates to ratification,
there is no reason in principle not to apply it to authorisation. There, the company had
had good relationships with the Canadian Pacific Railway Company as a result of the
satisfactory performance of a series of contracts. The last of the series of contracts was
negotiated in the same way but the defendant directors took the contract for themselves.
The claimant sued the defendants alleging that the company was entitled to the benefit
of  the  contract.  He  further  claimed  that  the  ratification  at  the  general  meeting,
comprising the defendants who held the majority of the shares, where it was decided
that the company had no interest in the contract,  was ineffective. The Privy Council
ruled in the claimant’s favor. The court distinguished the facts in the case and that in
North-West Transportation Co v Beatty and Burland v Earle. It said that in the latter two
cases, the director sold to his company property ‘which was in equity as well as at law
his own’.61 By contrast, the contract in Cook v Deeks in equity belonged to the company.
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Ratifiable v non-ratifiable breach
Commentators have argued that parties cannot consent to the breach in Cook v Deeks; in
other words, the breach in Cook v Deeks constitutes a non-ratifiable breach because it
involves misappropriation of the company’s property, in which all shareholders have a
pro-rata interest.62 By contrast, the breaches in North-West Transportation v Beatty63 and
Burland  v  Earle64 are  ratifiable  because  no  such  misappropriation  was  involved.
Professors Davies and Worthington argue that the ‘existence of a set of non-ratifiable
wrongs  is  established  in  the  case-law...’65 But  they  recognize  that  the  scope  of
unratifiable wrongs is unclear. 
It is not necessary for the purpose of this article to resolve or arrive at a conclusive view
on  the  debate  concerning  the  consequences  of  unratifiable  wrongs  or  fraud  on  the
minority66 given that the aim of this article is not to examine the nature, scope and effect
of  ratification  and  its  relationship  with  the  derivative  action.67 What  is,  however,
necessary and sufficient  in this  section is to show two things. First,  the category of
unratifiable wrongs does exist, even if the scope remains unsettled, because that goes to
undermining the claim that all breaches of fiduciary duties can be excluded or released.
And second, the cases of Cook v Deeks and Regal Hastings are reconcilable on the basis
of  fairness  to  minorities,  given  that  many  commentators  have  argued  that  the
fundamental reason for the uncertainty surrounding the scope of unratifiable wrongs is
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because those high authorities are irreconcilable.68 Crucially, the principle underpinning
unratifiable wrongs – fairness to minorities – provides a justification for the existence of
the  category  of  unratifiable  wrong;  this  justification  helps  to  explain  why  certain
breaches  of  fiduciary  duties  should not  be  excluded  or  released,  in  addition  to
explaining why only certain breaches could be excluded.
Professors Davies and Worthington distinguish a breach involving misappropriation of
company’s property and that which involves merely making incidental profits for which
the directors are liable to account to the company. They argue that the former is non-
ratifiable whereas the latter is. They cite Regal Hastings in support of the latter. 
Such a distinction, however, is difficult to reconcile with certain cases. For example, the
influential dictum in Burland v Earle stated that ‘money, property or advantages which
belong to the company, or in which the other shareholders are entitled to participate’
cannot be ratified. It can be argued that making an incidental profit at the company’s
expense falls within the term ‘advantage’. The House of Lords in Jubilee Cotton Mills
Ltd v Lewis69 held that secret profits made either by director or promoter ‘belong to’ the
company in equity and that he is ‘bound to hand over what he has got quoeunque modo
from what  is  really  the  property  of  the  company’.70  Further,  Lord  Wedderburn  is
sceptical of the distinction between  Regal Hastings and  Cook v Deeks because, given
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that ‘corporate opportunities are included within the area of assets’, is there a principled
reason for excluding secret profits?71
It is submitted that a more convincing reason why the making of incidental profits in
Regal Hastings was ratifiable is because the minority shareholders were not prejudiced.
This is consistent with the reasoning in North-West Transportation and Burland v Earle
where  the  courts  expressed  solicitude  for  minority  shareholders  who  might  be
prejudiced by the action of the majority shareholders  who approved the transaction.
This is also consistent with Daniels v Daniels. There, both the husband and wife were
the  directors  and  majority  shareholders.  The  husband  authorised  the  sale  of  the
company’s property at a gross undervalue to the wife, clearly to the detriment of the
minority shareholders. Templeman J said that the husband’s wrongdoing could not be
ratified.  Although  Templeman  J  said  that  directors  are  barred  from exercising  their
powers which benefit themselves ‘at the expense of the company’, he was having the
minorities’  interests  in  mind,  because  he  arrived  at  that  proposition  by  specifically
relying on cases which expressly demonstrated solicitude for the minorities.72
In Regal Hastings, the directors decided that the subsidiary company could not satisfy
the  lessor’s  demand  for  the  paid-up  capital,  and  they  also  decided  not  to  obtain
additional financing for the parent company to capitalise the subsidiary. This enabled
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them to subscribe for a portion of the shares of the subsidiary. The other portion was
subscribed by the parent company. Subsequently, the directors caused the shares of both
parent and subsidiary companies to be sold. They made a profit. Crucially, it was not in
dispute that the minority shareholders in the parent company profited from the sale as
well. In any event, the outcome of the case would not have made a material difference
to the welfare of the minority shareholders. It is not the case that they would be able to
sell the shares at a higher price (either to the same or different purchaser) or that they
could set aside the sale. This is because the purchasers’ claim in Regal Hastings was not
to void the transaction, but for a disgorgement of profits from the directors, the proceeds
of which would be entirely pocketed by the purchasers. 
To put it differently, in the words of the court in North-West Transportation, it was not
demonstrated on the facts in  Regal Hastings that the sale was ‘illegal or fraudulent or
oppressive towards those shareholders who oppose it’.73 Nor, in the words of the court
in  Burland v Earle,  was  it  demonstrated  that  ‘the other  shareholders  are  entitled  to
participate in’,74 or benefit from, the ‘money, property or advantages’75 appropriated by
the directors. On the contrary, the only ones who could and did benefit from the lawsuit
in Regal Hastings were the purchasers. This has to be distinguished from Cook v Deeks
where the minority shareholders would benefit,  albeit  indirectly, from an account of
profits from the defendant directors, which was the result in the case. Indeed, Professors
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Davies  and  Worthington  observe  that  ‘the  claim  in  Regal  Hastings was  wholly
unmeritorious.  Recovery by the company benefited only the purchasers, who in this
way received an undeserved windfall  resulting,  in effect,  in a reduction in the price
which they had freely agreed to pay.’76 
Accordingly, while the existence of non-ratifiable breach is supported by authorities, it
is submitted that  a better explanation for what constitutes ratifiable and non-ratifiable
breaches  lies  in  whether  or  not  the  interest  of  the  minority  shareholders  would  be
unduly jeopardised.  This  explanation  provides  a  better  basis  for reconciling  Cook v
Deeks with  Regal Hastings.  Further, it  is consistent with the reasoning and result  in
North-West Transportation, Burland v Earle and Daniels v Daniels. 
Moreover, the solicitude for minorities is also evidenced in other areas of law such as
the unfair prejudice remedy under section 994 of the Act. For example, Lord Hoffmann
said:  ‘the requirement that prejudice must be suffered as a member should not be too
narrowly or technically construed’.77 Arden LJ held that ‘the courts take a wide view of
prejudice suffered by a shareholder’.78 She emphasised the ‘adaptability’79 of the unfair
prejudice remedy, noted its ‘contextual’80 nature and repeatedly highlighted that it  is
‘flexible and open-textured’.81  Indeed, courts have held that section 994 is not limited
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to conduct unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members as members and could extend
to conduct prejudicial to other interests of members, such as creditors.82
Finally, given the existence of non-ratifiable and ratifiable breaches, there is no reason
in  principle  why  the  same  reasoning  should  not  be  applicable  to  the  authorisation
mechanism under section 180(4)(a) of the Act. In other words, there are certain acts or
transactions  to  which  advance  consent  could  not  be  given  by shareholders.  Indeed,
Professors Davies and Worthington state that ‘it would appear that the doctrine of the
non-ratifiable  breach restricts  the  scope of  authorisation  as  much  as  it  does  that  of
ratification…’83
In sum, it should be remembered that the object of the above analysis is twofold: to
demonstrate the mandatory limitations on the opting out mechanisms and to explain an
underlying  justification,  namely,  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders.  These
limitations and their rationales not only show that the claim that fiduciary duties can and
should be contracted out as long as there is informed consent is more nuanced than that
stated  by  Edelman  J,  but  they  undermine  a  key,  animating  assumption  that  party





The other mechanism for contracting out of fiduciary duties is exemption. Section 232
of  the  Act concerns  whether  and  the  circumstances  under  which  directors  can  be
exempted  from  liability.  This  provision  in  effect  transforms  directors’  duties  into
mandatory provisions.  This  is  because section 232(1) states  that  ‘any provision that
purports to exempt a director of a company (to any extent) from any liability that would
otherwise attach to him in connection with any negligence, default, breach of duty or
breach  of  trust  in  relation  to  the  company is  void’.  So,  directors’ duties  cannot  be
waived or released in advance. Thus, qualification has to be made to a key implication
arising  from  the  claim  that  because  directors’  fiduciary  duties  are  voluntary
undertakings, the beneficiaries of those duties can release the directors from liability. 
Nonetheless, some exemptions are allowed because section 232(4) states that ‘nothing
in  this  section  prevents  a  company’s  articles  from  making  such  provision  as  has
previously been lawful for dealing with conflicts of interest’. What are the ‘previously
lawful’ provisions? It should be noted that they are limited. They included provisions
such as 1985 Table A, Article 8586 as well as 1948 Table A, Articles 7887 and 84.88 As a
leading company law text observes, ‘these provisions were relatively modest pragmatic
provisions dealing with the reality of business relationships, situations which would fall
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primarily within section 177 rather than section 175. That background would further
support the view that there is little scope for provisions in the articles with respect to the
broader conflicts governed by section 175’.89 
The issue here is whether and the extent to which companies can adopt articles, despite
not exactly following those ‘previously lawful’ provisions, that will still be valid under
section 232(1). In other words, can liability for breach of directors’ duties be exempted
further under section 232(4) than that prescribed by the abovementioned articles, while
not contravening  section 232(1)? It is submitted, for the reasons given below, that the
answer  should  be  in  the  negative.  This  issue  is  important  for  the  present  purpose
because the answer we give to that will show that the position is more nuanced than
Edelman J’s claim that all fiduciary duties are excludable.
In Movitex Ltd v Bulfield90, the company’s articles were more extensive than Article 84
of the 1948 Table A. The articles permitted a director to be interested in the transactions
in which the company was interested, and also allowed him to profit from them, if he
disclosed  his  interest  to  the  board  and  if  he  did  not  vote,  although  there  were
circumstances  where he could vote and his votes would be counted.  The difference
between  the  articles  in  question  and  Article  84  was  that  the  number  of  such
circumstances was greater in the former than the latter. Vinelott J held that the articles
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were valid and did not violate section 205 of the Companies Act 1948 (now section 232
of the Act). This is because the equitable principle underlying the articles in question – a
director  is  prohibited  from  placing  themselves  in  a  position  in  which  his  personal
interest conflicts with his duty to the company – is a disability, not duty. Since section
205 concerned exemptions from liability, which presupposed a duty and its breach, and
given  that  the  principle  underlying  the  articles  in  question  were concerned  with
disability and not duty, it was not covered by section 205. 
Vinelott J’s reasoning is objectionable for two principal reasons. First, the distinction
between disability and duty has been rendered otiose because the equitable principle has
been codified as a duty in section 175(1) of the Act. Second, according to the Court of
Appeal in Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Koshy (No 3)91, ‘[w]hether viewed as
duties or disabilities, all such incidents are aspects of the fiduciary's primary obligation
of  loyalty’.92 Unsurprisingly,  the  court  criticised  the  distinction  as  a  ‘needless
complication’.93 
It  has  been  asserted  that  Vinelott  J  in  effect  sanctioned  articles  which  permitted  a
director  to  place  himself  in  a position of potential,  as  opposed to  actual  conflict  of
interest.94 But this seems to contradict the express and clear wording of section 175(1):
“A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or
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indirect  interest  that  conflicts,  or  possibly  may conflict,  with  the  interests  of  the
company’. No explanation is given as to how such a contradiction can be resolved. 
Birds claims that ‘the general rule imposing accountability for secret profits, as well as
that avoiding a transaction involving a conflict of duty and interest, would, on Vinelott
J’s analysis, have been excludable, so long as the director acted in good faith….[and
this] is acceptable as a matter of policy’.95 To Birds, Vinelott J’s view in effect allows
the articles to exclude all breaches of the no-conflict and no-profit rules, if the directors
acted in good faith. This is problematic. Not only does Birds fail to state what the policy
is, his and Vinelott  J’s reasoning is anathema to the prophylactic nature of fiduciary
doctrine, a function of which is to ‘avert breaches of non-fiduciary duties by seeking to
neutralise influences likely to sway the fiduciary away from properly performing those
non-fiduciary duties’.96 
Moreover and crucially, the interests of minority shareholders will be jeopardised. It
would be difficult to alter the exemption provision in the articles. They also will not
appreciate  sufficiently  the  effect  of  the  provision on the long-term,  open-ended and
unpredictable  relationship  among  the  parties.  Thus,  a  broad  exemption  provision
excluding liability from the breach of no-conflict and no-profit rules, other than those
rendered previously lawful, should be barred. Indeed, such a clause is ‘uninformed and
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speculative’.97 For  example,  the  shareholders  might  give  undue weight  to  the  good
relationship which they had with the directors at the time in which they agreed to the
exemption  provision and might discount or downplay the possibility that the directors
might exercise the provision to their detriment at some point in the future.98 They might
fail  to  appreciate  the  fact  that  the  past  or  present  (positive)  relationship  is  not  an
indicator  of  directors’  future  conduct. By  contrast,  an  exemption  provision that  is
restricted to those previously rendered lawful will promote certainty and clarity.
In response to the argument that the company and shareholders would have agreed to
such exemption provision, the Greene Committee, which recommended the introduction
of the predecessor of section 232, section 205 of the Companies Act 1929, said: 
It is, moreover, in our opinion, fallacious to say that shareholders must be taken to
have  agreed  that  their  directors  should  be  placed  in  this  remarkable  position.  The
articles  are  drafted  on  the  instructions  of  those  concerned  in  the  formation  of  the
company, and it is obviously a matter of great difficulty and delicacy for shareholders to
attempt to alter such an article as that under consideration.99 
Finally, if the company were a public company, it will be very difficult for shareholders
to price such an exemption  provision. This is because of two reasons articulated by
Coffee.100 First,  shareholders may rely on the past behaviour of directors in order to
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determine how the provision will play out but past behaviour is not a reliable predictor
of future behaviour and directors may change their future behaviour in response to such
a  provision.  Second,  shareholders  should  not  assume  that  directors  will  exploit  the
provision and act in an utterly self-interested manner and therefore discount the value of
the shares. This is because directors are also constrained by non-legal reasons such as
market forces and the preservation of reputation. 
For all of the above reasons, it is submitted that companies should only adopt exemption
clauses which do not depart from those previously lawful provisions. An extension of
those provisions is unadvisable. Therefore, the circumstances in which directors’ duties
can and ought to be excluded are very limited. It is very different from the view that
fiduciary duties can or should be opted out unless there is fraud, incapacity, coercion or
unconscionability. 
Indirect exemption: Wilkinson v West Coast Capital
The above analysis  concerns  direct  exemption.  But  what  about  indirect  exemption?
Suppose there is a provision in the articles which restricts the company’s business to a
certain  scope  but  permits  the  company  to  diversify  its  business  only  if  consent  is
obtained from 66% of the shareholders.  According to Warren J in  Wilkinson v West
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Coast Capital,101 if an opportunity to acquire another company (of a different business)
comes  up,  the  shareholders,  who  are  also  directors,  can  refuse  to  consent  to  the
acquisition, even if the board is of the view that the  company (i.e. the acquirer)  will
benefit from it. Thus, the directors, voting as shareholders, who refuse the consent, can
exploit the opportunity for themselves. It is irrelevant whether the information on the
opportunity  to  acquire  was  obtained  by  them  in  the  course  of  acting  as  directors.
According to Warren J, they will be exempted from liability for breach of fiduciary duty
as  directors  to  the  company.102 This  is  because  the  directors,  when  voting  as
shareholders, are under no duty to use their votes to approve the acquisition.103 This is
an example of an indirect exemption provision, or a provision, though not on its face
exempting directors from liability, has the effect of doing so. What this means is that the
directors, who are also shareholders, can exercise their votes as they please, even if by
doing so, the company’s interest will be harmed.104 This is because shareholders, unlike
directors, do not owe fiduciary duties to the company.
Warren J’s reasoning is unsatisfactory. Even where directors vote as members, they can
exercise their votes with impunity in order to harm the company’s interests, or although
not intending to do so, the effect of which is to do so.105 And directors cannot be held
accountable for exploiting the opportunity and making a profit, even if it is a clear case
of  conflict  of  interest.  It  is  a  clear  case  because,  although the  scope of  the target’s
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business is different from the acquirer’s, the board of the acquirer has determined that it
is in the latter’s interest to make the acquisition. And yet, the directors are permitted to
exploit the opportunity. Thus, the interests of the directors conflict with the company’s.  
Similarly, Warren J held that the same principles apply to provisions in the shareholders’
agreement in question. In that case, Clause 5 of the agreement provided ‘unless the
shareholders holding in excess of 65% of the issued shares otherwise agree in writing
the shareholders shall exercise their power in relation to the company so as to ensure
that...  the  company  does  not  acquire  or  invest  in  another  company  or  business  or
incorporate any subsidiary’. Warren J held that because the shareholders did not agree to
the acquisition, the directors, who were also the shareholders, were thus free to exploit
the opportunity and were exempted from liability.106 
So, there is first instance authority to support the proposition that fiduciary duties can be
contracted  out  through  such  indirect  exemption  provisions  in  the  articles  or
shareholders’ agreement. This appears to lend support to Edelman J’s claim. But the
more important and interesting issue for our purpose here is whether there ought to be
any  limitation  on  such  indirect  exemption  provision that  is  independent  of  the
undertaking of the parties, and which is in addition to fraud, unconscionability or bad
faith. This issue is crucial because it could undermine the claim that all fiduciary duties
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should be excludable unless there is fraud, unconscionability or bad faith. It will be
argued below that where directors vote as shareholders, they ought to be constrained by
the duty to act in good faith for the benefit of the company as a whole. In other words, it
will be argued that there is no convincing reason in principle to preclude the extension
of the duty imposed on shareholders to act bona fide for the company’s benefit as a
whole  in  the  context  of  alteration  of  articles107 to  the  situation  involving  indirect
exemption, as shown by the facts in Wilkinson v West Coast Capital. 
It is important to note that the requirement that the power to alter the articles must be
exercised bona fide for the company’s benefit as a whole is justifiable on the basis of the
protection of minority shareholders’ interests. This justification also underpins the law
concerning ratification and authorisation as well  as the distinction between ratifiable
and non-ratifiable breaches, as discussed in Part I. Lindley MR in Allen v Gold Reefs of
West Africa108 held that because the power to alter the articles is a power enabling the
majority to bind the minorities,109 that power must not be exercised to the detriment of
minority shareholders’ interests. Although he formulated the rules in the language of
‘for  the  benefit  of  the  company  as  a  whole’,  he  had  the  protection  of  minority
shareholders in mind. Lindley MR said: 
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Wide, however, as the language of s. 50 is, the power conferred by it must, like all
other powers, be exercised subject to those general principles of law and equity which are
applicable to all powers conferred on majorities and enabling them to bind minorities. It
must be exercised, not only in the manner required by law, but also bona fide for the
benefit of the company as a whole, and it must not be exceeded.
So, protection of minorities’ interests is a normative justification underlying the rule in
Allen  v Gold Reefs.  Concern for minorities’ interests  was also evident  in  two other
cases. In Brown v British Abrasive Wheel Company Co,110 the court said: 
The question therefore is whether the enforcement of the proposed alteration on the
minority is within the ordinary principles of justice…I find it very difficult to follow how
it can be just and equitable that a majority, on failing to purchase the shares of a minority
by agreement, can take power to do so compulsorily.111 
And in Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas,112 the court held that a special resolution in that
case ‘would be liable to be impeached if the effect of it were to discriminate between
the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders, so as to give the former an
advantage of which the latter were deprived’.113 
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One objection to extending  the duty to act bona fide for the company’s benefit to the
context of indirect exemption  is that although shareholders are subject to the duty of
good  faith,  a  distinction  has  to  be  drawn  between  non-fiduciaries  and  fiduciaries.
Professors Nolan and Conaglen argue that the duty of good faith only requires the non-
fiduciary, the controlling shareholders in our case, not to intentionally harm the interest
of the minority shareholders.114 They are not subject to the requirement not to exercise
their powers that will thwart the furtherance of the beneficiary’s or principal’s interests.
By contrast,  fiduciaries, such as directors, are subject to this requirement.  Therefore,
Professors Nolan and Conaglen argue that it  is easy to reconcile the proposition that
shareholders can vote in their self-interest with that of shareholders being under a duty
to act in good faith when they alter the articles, as stated in Allen v Gold Reefs of West
Africa Ltd.115 According to them, the reason is that good faith in this context merely bars
the shareholders from voting in a way that intentionally harms the interests of the other
shareholders,  except  to  the  extent  that  the  harm is  a  necessary  consequence  of  the
shareholders lawfully acting in their self-interest.116 
But there are two difficulties with their understanding of the duty of good faith to which
shareholders are subject. First, for our purpose, the duty of good faith – understood as
not intentionally harming another party’s interest – lacks any bite. It will be virtually
impossible, in the example discussed above, to prove that the shareholders deliberately
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did not consent to the acquisition in order to inflict harm on the minority shareholders.
Absent unusual circumstances, what can be proven is that they acted out of self-interests
so that they can exploit  the opportunity and be exempted from liability as directors.
Good  faith,  in  the  attenuated  sense  articulated  by  Professors  Nolan  and  Conaglen,
appears to be simply the flip side of bad faith. The duty to act in good faith is merely the
duty not to act in bad faith. Not only does it lack any bite, but such a duty does not add
anything new to the existing requirement that non-fiduciaries must not act in bad faith.
It does not pose a credible limitation on indirect exemption provisions. 
The other more serious difficulty is that contrary to the claim made by Professors Nolan
and Conaglen, the duty imposed on shareholders to act ‘bona fide for the benefit of the
company  as  whole’  when  they  alter  the  articles  extends  beyond  not  intentionally
inflicting harm on the other shareholders. In Brown v British Abrasive Wheel Co,117 for
example, a company urgently required capital injection. 98% of the shareholders agreed
to provide the capital on condition that they could acquire the remaining shares. But the
remaining shareholders rejected this offer. So, the majority proposed to alter the articles
by adding a provision to the effect that if 90% of the shareholders require a shareholder
to transfer his shares, the latter is obliged to do so. The good faith of the majority was
never an issue. They did not intend to harm the interests of the minority. The alteration
was motivated by the company’s interests. Still,  the court  held that the result of the
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alteration,  which  allowed  the  majority  to  expropriate  the  minority,  was  not  for  the
benefit  of the company as  a  whole but  only for  the  majority’s benefit.  This clearly
implies it is necessary but insufficient that the majority shareholders did not act in bad
faith in Professors Nolan and Conaglen’s sense, i.e. they did not intentionally harm the
interests of the other shareholders. Something more is required: benefit to the company
has to be demonstrated, and the proposed article has to be narrowly drafted to tailor to
the purpose for which the change was made;  otherwise the proposed article  will  be
invalidated even if bad faith is absent. Moreover, in Sidebottom v Kershaw, Leese & Co
Ltd,118 the court held that a proposed resolution to add a provision to the articles  to
enable the company to require any shareholder who competed with the company to sell
his shares at fair value to the company was valid because it benefited the company. 
Professors Nolan and Conaglen may distinguish the above cases on the basis that they
deal with compulsory transfer of shares. In other types of situations,  they could cite
Shuttleworth v Cox Bros Ltd119 as authority for the proposition that the court will defer
to the members and will not intervene unless bad faith (i.e. deliberate harm) is shown.
But  the  deference  has  not  been  uncritical.  As  Professors  Davies  and  Worthington
observe, there is an element of ‘objective control’ in the bona fide test – ‘the decision
[has to]  be one which a  reasonable shareholder  could have considered to  be in the
interests  of the company’.120 This is  a far cry from the mere requirement,  stated by
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Professors Nolan  and  Conaglen, not  to  intentionally  inflict  harm  on  minority
shareholders. 
 
Given that benefit to the company has to be demonstrated in order to satisfy the bona
fide test,  the  issue here  is  whether  this  test  should be  applied  to  circumstances  not
involving the alteration of the company’s articles.  That is,  in the above example on
indirect exemption provision in the articles or shareholders’ agreement, should the law
require  the directors,  voting as shareholders,  to  act  bona fide for  the benefit  of  the
company  as  a  whole?  It  is  not  an  answer  to  say  that  this  will  conflict  with  the
proposition that shareholders can vote as they please and can do so without regard to the
adverse  effect  it  would  have  on  the  company.  This  is  because  if  this  answer  were
correct, then the law in the very first place should not have imposed on shareholders the
duty to act bona fide  for the benefit of the company as a whole when they alter the
articles. 
The real  issue here is  whether  there is  any principled  and coherent  justification  for
restricting the bona fide requirement only to the situation involving alteration of articles,
especially  given  the  fact  that  interests  of  the  company  and  especially  minority
shareholders  will  clearly  be  harmed  in  the  example  discussed  above.  To recap  the
example,  the board decided that taking up the opportunity to pursue the acquisition,
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which came to the knowledge of the directors acting in the course of directorship, is in
the company’s interest. But there is a provision in either the company’s articles, or the
shareholders’ agreement, which stipulates that consent from a certain percentage of the
shareholders  is  required  for  this  acquisition.  But  the  same  directors,  voting  as
shareholders,  refused  to  consent  to  the  acquisition  so  that  they  could  exploit  it
themselves. In this situation, the company suffers twice. First, the losses it would have
suffered as a result of being prohibited from making use of the opportunity. Second, it
cannot sue the directors for breach of fiduciary duties for exploiting the opportunity and
making a profit; this is because the directors are exempted from liability. And needless
to say, the minority shareholders also suffer.
It  is  submitted  that  given  that  shareholders’  agreement  can  amount  to  a  special
resolution altering the articles,121 the indirect exemption  provision in the shareholders’
agreement has to be subject to the same requirement that shareholders have to act bona
fide for the company’s benefit as a whole when they seek to alter the articles. In relation
to the indirect exemption provision in the articles, one way of analysing this issue is to
ask ourselves  what  if  there  were initially  no  such provision  in  the  articles,  but  the
directors,  acting as shareholders,  decided to alter  the articles in order to introduce a
provision in the articles which precludes the company from undertaking the acquisition,
so that they could exploit the opportunity for themselves? In this situation, would not
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the shareholders be subject to the requirement to act bona fide for the benefit of the
company as a whole? What material difference does it make to the analysis whether the
indirect exemption provision happened to be in the articles in the first place or whether
it was subsequently included upon alteration? Unless a compelling justification is given
for  what  makes  shareholders’  alteration  of  articles  unique  so  as  to  confine  the
imposition of the bona fide duty only to that situation, it is submitted that in the specific
example concerning indirect exemption provision in the articles described above, the
directors, when voting as shareholders, should be subject to the same requirement to act
bona fide for the company’s benefit as a whole. 
Moreover, while Australian case law has recognised shareholders’ right to vote for their
benefit, it has extended the requirement that shareholders must vote bona fide for the
benefit of the company as  a  whole beyond the situation of alteration of articles, and
imposed a general requirement that shareholders must exercise their voting powers for
the company’s benefit as a whole.122
The practical effect of imposing this duty would not lead to the denial of the right of the
majority  shareholders  to  pursue the opportunity. This is  because the bona fide duty
requires that only if the court  is satisfied that no reasonable shareholder could have
thought  that  the  decision  was  in  the  company’s  interest,  then  the  decision  will  be
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invalidated. This is not an easy burden. To illustrate, let us return to our earlier example.
Suppose that the company was in need of financing and the only financing available to
the company was from the majority. The majority agreed to finance the company only if
they were allowed to pursue the acquisition. In this situation, the majority, who were
also  the  directors,  might  have  performed  a  cost  benefit  analysis  and  arrived  at  the
genuinely held belief that a reasonable shareholder could have considered that obtaining
the financing was in the company’s interest, rather than voting to allow the company to
pursue the acquisition. Thus, consent was withheld by the majority, and the majority
took up the  opportunity  instead.  In  this  case,  it  is  submitted  that  the  shareholders’
decision would be upheld by the court.
In sum, in the context of indirect exemption, that is, where directors who are also the
controlling shareholders exercise their power to vote in order to allow themselves to
exploit  opportunities  which  they  encounter  in  their  course  of  their  directorship,  the
effect of which is to exempt themselves from breaches of fiduciary duties, the law ought
to constrain their exercise of voting power by requiring them to act bona fide for the
benefit of the company. It is submitted that this requirement undermines the claim that
fiduciary  duties  ought  to  be  excludable  as  long  as  there  is  no  fraud,  coercion  or
unconscionability.  Further,  because  the  normative  justification  underlying  this
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restriction is protection of minorities’ interest, it is highly questionable whether party
autonomy ought to be the paramount or overriding consideration. 
Conclusion
This article critiques the claim that all fiduciary duties are excludable absent dishonesty,
coercion or unconscionability.  It  shows that  this  claim is  doctrinally  unjustified  and
normatively questionable. In relation to authorisation and ratification, the law will not
and should not permit  ex ante  or ex post consent  to  such acts  if  the minorities  are
oppressed. With regards to direct exemption provisions, the law should not permit a
broad  exemption  excluding  liability  other  than  those  rendered  previously  unlawful
because, among other reasons, the minority shareholders have inadequate and unequal
information on the existence and scope of the provisions. And as for indirect exemption
provisions,  the  law  should  impose  a  requirement  that  directors  when  they  vote  as
shareholders have to exercise their votes for the benefit of the company as a whole in
order to ensure that minorities are treated fairly.
Finally, by critiquing a key implication arising from the claim that fiduciary duties are
terms expressed or implied into voluntary undertakings from an English company law
doctrinal  perspective,  this  article  hopes to caution against the propensity to produce
‘overarching’ or ‘grand’123 theories that purport to rationalise,  unify and subsume an
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area of law, practice or phenomenon,  that  is  so complex and multi-faceted,  such as
fiduciary duties in this instance, under the rubric of a monolithic and uniform concept.
While ‘overarching’ theories can provide an elegant explanation of the law, this may
ride roughshod over the nuances, complexities and ambiguities in other aspects of legal
doctrines.
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